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Abstract—Interactions between pedestrians, bikers, and
human-driven vehicles have been a major concern in traffic
safety over the years. The upcoming age of autonomous vehicles
will further raise major problems on whether self-driving cars
can accurately avoid accidents; on the other hand, usability
issues arise on whether human-driven cars and pedestrians can
dominate the road at the expense of the autonomous vehicles
which will be programmed to avoid accidents. This paper
proposes some game theoretical models applied to related traffic
scenarios, where the strategic interaction between a pedestrian
and an autonomous vehicle is analyzed. The games have been
simulated in order to demonstrate the theoretical analysis and
the predicted behaviors. These investigations can shed new lights
on how novel urban traffic regulations could be required to
allow for a better interaction of vehicles and a general improved
management of traffic and communication vehicular networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Smart connected machines are expected to be one of the
most sensational innovations developed over the next ten
years. Present-day technologies can benefit from the compu-
tational improvement of processors and the increase in the
amount of data collected by smart sensors, as well as the
empowerment of machine learning techniques such as deep
neural networks, as was already pointed out in 2010 [1]. The
trend in this field will be likely led by autonomous vehicles
(AVs), which might set up the most exciting revolution in
everyday’s customs and lifestyle of contemporary society.
Connected and self-driving cars are currently set by the 2016
Gartner’s Hype Cycle on the top of the Peak of Inflated
Expectations [2].
This can benefit the quality of life of citizens in future
societies by several means. For example, AVs are expected
to significantly reduce road accidents, since they can be
less error-prone than the human drivers and be programmed
to avoid unnecessary risks. We recall that in the European
Union alone there are more than 25 thousand deaths in road
accidents every year [3]. Still, the human factor will be
present in the interaction with pedestrian; thus, besides being
risk averse per se, connected vehicles should also implement
additional mechanisms, for example, they might also notify
their presence to distracted pedestrians, as suggested in [4].
An open challenge still involves the description of interac-
tions in this future scenarios where human drivers and AVs,
as well as pedestrians and cyclists, will coexist. Many studies
have been proposed in the literature to shed light on these
aspects, and game theoretical and/or statistical approaches
have been advanced. Surveys and predictions of the future
transport systems can be found, for example, in [5] and
[6]. The latter also gained mass attention thanks to popular
divulgative versions such as [7] and [8]. Specifically, the idea
of [6] is to build up a two-players game between a pedestrian
crossing a street and a (possibly self-driven) vehicle reaching
the pedestrian crossing. The actions of the players in face of
a possible collision are either to keep moving in the intended
direction or to yield. This analysis led to some considerations
about possible behaviors of the pedestrian player, which can
be summarized as concluding that pedestrians will be unsure
on whether to cross the street or yield if they assume that the
incoming vehicle is human-driven, since they may fear that the
human driver will not stop, while they will more boldly cross
the street in front of an AV, relying on it to stop. Thus, the
author suggests that beyond increasing safety for pedestrians,
a new scenario for coexistence of road users will open up
where pedestrians will have the supremacy over the AVs and
it may be necessary to regulate the traffic response.
Inspired by this open issue, in this paper we present the
following contributions, where our goal is to review multiple
road scenarios, all involving pedestrians and vehicles but
including different points of view than the aforementioned
one. In this context, we will use a Bayesian game theoretical
model to derive conclusions that will also be verified by
computer simulation. More specifically, we will discuss first of
all the impact of the increase in the share of vehicles that are
connected to the Internet and autonomously driven in a classic
scenario involving a pedestrian/cyclist crossing a street and
an incoming vehicle. Thus, beyond generally concluding that
the pedestrian player will eventually be safer and at the same
time will get control of the road over the AVs, we will also be
able to provide a quantitative evaluation of this phenomenon.
Furthermore, we will analyze the behavior of pedestrians in a
more detailed situation where they can decide whether or not
to cross, involving different parameters settings.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II reviews the applications of game theory to road user
scenarios already existing in the literature. Sections III and
IV presents two different scenarios, namely a Bayesian model
for a Cyclist/Autonomous Vehicle interaction and a Pedestrian
crossing modeled as a Bayesian entry game, respectiely,
and discuss the obtained results. Section V concludes the
paper and outlines the main future guidelines and possible
expansions for future work.
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II. RELATED WORK
Among the many applications of game theory, in the last
few years, an increasing interest of the scientific community
was produced towards the implementation of game theoretical
techniques in traffic scenarios. Indeed, traffic interactions are
a quite ideal field of application for game theory, as they
usually involve: conflicts with different perspectives of the
users (and, as a result, different utilities); a generally limited
but clearly distinguishable set of options for the involved
players; occurrence of repetitions in many instances of the
game, thus allowing for large numbers and statistical gener-
ality. Therefore, game theory can offer an accurate strategic
analysis that can be used to clarify whether certain road users
have common or conflicting interests; it also shows explicitly
the choices facing road users and is able to make specific
predictions about road user behaviors, which are therefore
empirically testable.
In [9], Bjørnskau performed some interesting investigations
about a Zebra Crossing Game for the cyclists in Norway;
he modeled the crossing game of a cyclist versus a driver
where the cyclist does the first move and can yield, cycle, or
dismount from the bike and walk, while the driver can either
drive or yield. By applying backward induction, it can be
shown that the only stable and perfect equilibrium turns out
to be cycle for the cyclist and yield for the driver; of course
the cyclist has the clear advantage of being the first mover;
in other words, he is the leader of a Stackelberg game [10].
Interesting reviews of game theoretical analysis applied on
road user behaviors can be found both in [11], which is one
of the first works trying to explain the complex dynamics
involved in traffic accidents, and in [12], where a set of many
road scenarios involving vehicles is proposed and solved.
A more sophisticated study about the micro-dynamics view-
point of the interactions between vehicles and pedestrians is
analyzed in [13], which models and simulates the relative
speed between the pedestrian and the approaching car at
uncontrolled mid-block crosswalks using a game theoretical
approach. Game theory was also exploited in [14] to perform
conflict resolution of AVs: they provide a simulation scenario
involving two crossing cars, which is further analyzed using
Cellular Automata. A pedestrian’s decision model for deter-
mining the behavior of two pedestrians attempting to avoid
collision when approaching a blind corner from both sides
was studied in [15] exploiting a combination of game theory
and the theory of evidence in order to account for uncertainty.
Others non-game-theory-based works that provide some
simulation results are mainly based on statistical models.
Those are not always able to capture the specific situations
and the causal relationships, as stated in [16]. For example
in [17] the interaction between the AVs and the pedestrians
is stochastically modeled through a multivariate Gaussian
function using real traffic data. Moreover, statistical tools
are applied in [18], where a scenario of automated vehicles
and pedestrians at crosswalks is analyzed in order to show a
significant influence of the vehicle speed on the pedestrian’s
decision process.
Our study brings the novel contribution of using more
advanced game theory techniques than those used in the
existing literature. Usually, game theory is employed as a
ready-to-use tool, which gives it a marginal role to the game
theoretic model in itself. Instead, we will consider a Bayesian
approach with a strong emphasis on the characterization
of different types of the involved players: e.g., probability
of a vehicle being human-driven or autonomous, as seen
from the perspective of a pedestrian/cyclists that has unclear
information and must resort to a prior probability. Moreover,
we will infer a behavioral characterization from numerical
evidence, as it is reasonable to expect that, as the share of
AVs increase, it will be more likely to encounter them and
the human cyclist or pedestrian can adapt their prior to reflect
that. This would also allow us to drive specific quantitative
conclusions that can give useful numerical insights.
III. CYCLIST VERSUS VEHICLE USING BAYESIAN GAME
The first scenario presented in this study regards the zebra
crossing of a cyclist with an upcoming driver, which can either
be autonomous or human-driven (and the cyclist tries to detect
it). As in the scenario proposed by [9], the cyclist has three
options in the strategy set: to yield, to dismount from the
bike and walk, or to cycle. Let these actions be denoted as Y,
W, C, respectively. On the other side, the vehicle can either
go or stop and let the cyclist cross (G or S, respectively).
The street regulations generally state that zebra crossing are
for pedestrian only; cyclists cannot cross the road there, but
instead they should dismount from the bike and walk in order
to have the right to cross. At the same time, the driver is
supposed by the same regulations to stop and let the cyclist
cross only if they has dismounted from the bike.
The situation described above can be modeled through a
simultaneous Bayesian game with two types as depicted in
extensive form in Fig. 1 where the payoffs are set for a vehicle
oncoming at a medium speed. As customary in Bayesian
game analysis [10] a virtual player, “nature,” initially draws
at random according to a prior distribution the character of
the vehicle (i.e., whether it is autonomous or human-driven,
with probabilities p and 1 − p, respectively). The game is
modeled as simultaneous because is considered the extreme
case of last chance for both players to act. The novel element
of our tractation is the Bayesian aspect that allows to take
into account the uncertainty on the type of the vehicle.
Even though road users have to take important decisions in
fractions of second, we can assume that common knowledge
and full rationality still apply: the players are fully informed
about the rules of the game, the possible actions, and the
evaluation of each other player to all the outcomes.
The aim of this game is to compare the cyclist’s behavior
when facing an autonomous or a human-driven vehicle and to
verify whether the accident rate will be reduced by increasing
the number of autonomous vehicles; in principle, autonomous
car can be programmed to be prompter to prevent accidents;
but on the other hand, human road users can act more boldly
in the presence of AVs. The standard solutions in game
theory are Nash Equilibria (NEs), which can be in either pure
or mixed strategies, the latter case being seen as providing
a probability distribution over the set of pure strategies of
the players. Since this game is also concerned about the
accident rate, the mixed NEs should be inspected: thus, the
payoffs need to be assigned following a cardinality relation.
Considering only the pure ones, in fact, the players will always
choose the same action, which is not interesting for the desired
purpose.
It is assumed that both players prefer not to collide (as
their primary goal) and secondly whether they can continue to
move, which, if available, is a dominant outcome over having
to stop and wait.
Summarizing, it is desirable that the payoffs reflect a heavy
penalization in case of collisions (high absolute value for
negative payoffs) and at the same time they do not overes-
timate the daily-action of crossing roads (low absolute value
for positive payoffs).
Beyond these assumptions, the evaluation of the payoffs are
challenging. The worst outcome for the cyclist (arbitrarily set
to −500) happens when he crosses the road and is hit by the
vehicle, no matter whether autonomous or human-driven, it is
worse than to be hit when walking (hence set, for instance,
to −400) because in this last case he is right according to
the traffic regulations. Then, the next worst outcome for the
cyclist is when he and the AV stop (slightly positive because
he acted following the road rules, e.g. set to 3), here they need
to play again in order to solve the game, this is considered
worse than to yield to an AV which does not stop (5). Same
considerations apply in case of a human-driven vehicle, which
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Figure 1. Extensive form of the game in Section III considering medium
speed, payoffs of the cyclist are given first.
leads to higher payoffs (respectively 6 and 8) because the
cyclist knows that the AV is programmed to be risk averse as
much as possible while the driver can be absent-minded. The
best outcomes for the cyclist are respectively to cycle over the
zebra crossing with a yielding vehicle (20) and to dismount
from the bike and walk over the zebra crossing with a yielding
vehicle (15).
The worst outcome for the driver is an AV hitting a
pedestrian (quantified as −500) because it is a machine-
type evaluation error, which is considered to be worse and
less socially accepted than a human-type error (quantified as
−400). Same considerations apply in case of a crossing cyclist
(with payoffs for AV and human-driver respectively −300 and
−200): the only difference is that the cyclist is wrong, so the
payoffs of the vehicle are higher than the previous case. The
next worst outcome for the driver is when they both yield
and it is a human driver (1), it is worse than the situation
in which both the autonomous vehicle and the cyclist yield
(10) because the AV is programmed to avoid accidents. This
last situation is slightly preferable to a yielding human-driver
when a cyclist cycles over the zebra crossing (7); this outcome
is very similar to a yielding human-driver when the pedestrian
walks and to an AV keeping driving when the cyclist yields,
which is not as good as a yielding AV because it is risk averse.
The best outcome for the vehicle happens when an AV stops
in front of a crossing cyclist because it is the right action for
the AV and when an human-driven vehicle keeps going as the
cyclist yields and stops.
In this game, there are two pure NEs: (CY, SG) and (CC,
SS). Those can be found simplifying the game via Iterated
Elimination of Strictly Dominated Strategies (IESDS) [10] and
then seeking for the NEs. IESDS can be applied since all
players are rational, i.e. they do not play strictly dominated
strategies, and rationality is a common knowledge: hence the
game is smaller and the procedure can be iterated.
The meaning of the two NEs found is: when the vehicle is
autonomous then the cyclist knows that can cycle therefore
the AV stops (stop for the AV is a strictly dominant strategy),
when the driver is human then both actions are available to the
driver and the cyclist yields or cycles. In both cases no player
has an incentive to deviate by changing his choice given the
choices of the others.
The unique mixed NE is to always play (C,S) in case of
autonomous vehicle and to mix between yield and cycle (with
probabilities 207/221 and 14/221) and between go and stop
(with probabilities 7/261 and 254/261) in case of human
driver. These results have been obtained by means of computer
simulations. Quite logically, the absolute numerical values
depend by the payoffs chosen and will be modified if other
values are set. Still, from a general perspective we can infer
that, whatever the specific values chosen, for most of the times
the players will choose to yield because the risk is too high;
however, sometimes they can decide to go.
In order to see that the rising number of AVs will decrease
the number of collisions, a simulation of the mixed strategies
was performed varying the probability of encountering an AV.
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Figure 2. Decreasing percentage of collisions of one crossing action at the
increasing percentage of AVs.
In addition to that, the simulation was also repeated using
other two different speed values of the oncoming vehicle. The
new payoffs are computed on the basis of the ones considered
in Fig. 1; in particular, for example, the payoffs of the cyclist
would get lower in case of a vehicle driving at a higher speed
because it would be a more serious accident and vice versa.
Furthermore the robustness of the model has been evaluated
by means of noisy payoffs thus confirming the general trend
obtained.
The results of a million iterations of the game are shown
in Fig. 2. Remarkably, the collision frequency exhibits a
decreasing trend; while the exact slope of the curve depends
on the evaluation of the outcomes; still, it may be worth
investigating further in relation to different parameters. Also,
we can see that it is more likely to have incidents at lower
speeds because pedestrians tend to cross the road more often
due to the lower risk implicated. However, the death rate is
much higher when higher speeds are involved. For example
purposes we can think that the low speed corresponds to about
30 km/h, the medium speed to about 45 km/h and the high
one to about 70 km/h. According to the report by the World
Health Organization (WHO) in [19] the rates of fatal injuries
are approximately 10% at 30 km/h, 50% at 45 km/h and
more than 99% at 70 km/h. With those assumptions the fatal
injuries rate is reported in Fig. 3. These results obtained from
game theory underline that a vehicle driving at high speed
causes a lower number of accidents but a greater share causing
fatal injuries.
The proposed model shows also that the AVs will always
stop because they will act as safe as possible, thus the pedes-
trians and the cyclists will act more boldly: there will be no
risk for them to cross in front of an AV, while with a human-
driven vehicle the risk is much greater because the driver
may be absent-minded or may not see the pedestrian crossing.
The model also assumes that the cyclist can recognize an AV
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percentage of AVs.
from a human-driven vehicle, which is sensible since AVs
will likely be esthetically quite different from current vehicles.
Thanks to this, the cyclist can determine whether to cycle or
to mix between cycle and yield. With a low number of human-
drivers in the traffic, then for the cyclist is prevailing to cycle.
If AVs end up to represent the majority of vehicles, it
could be very likely that pedestrian and cyclists tend to
dominate the scenario (i.e., they always win the contention for
crossing the street). To mitigate this behavior, some expedients
can be used, for example crosswalks can be re-designed by
city-planners also with physical barriers in order to reduce
the direct interactions between pedestrians and AVs and, at
the same time, street regulation could be changed so that
pedestrians do not have priority when crossing the road, as
pointed out in [6]. For example purposes, we can think of
a fine for both cyclists and pedestrians crossing the roads
without looking or waiting their right to cross. This would
be possibly reflected into some payoffs variations, and a new
game analysis.
For cyclists, the worst cases are when they cycle (−600) or
walk (−500), respectively, and in both cases the AV drives; the
values are lower than the previous ones because in this new
setup the cyclist is also partially responsible for the accent.
Both walk/stop and cycle/stop have been penalized with a fine
of 15, which is assumed to be a certain punishment and it is
common knowledge: then yield/stop (15) and yield/go (18)
are the right solutions according to the new street regulations.
For the AV, the worst outcomes are to hit the pedestrian
(−400) or the cyclist (−200). If they both yield (4), they need
to renegotiate the solution. Then walk/stop and cycle/stop (5)
are the next worst outcomes because the AV had the right to
pass. The best outcome is achieved when they play yield/go
(10).
The resulting game in normal form is represented by Table I.
The unique NE of the game is yield/go since it is immediate to
Go Stop
Yield 18,10 15,4
Walk -500,-400 0,5
Cycle -600,-200 5,5
Table I
NORMAL FORM OF THE GAME IN SECTION III WITH MODIFIED PAYOFFS.
Out Cross
Pedestrian
Vehicle
Keep Brake
(ta-tc’)
0
(tc-ta)
(tc-ta)
(tc’-ta)
(ta-tc)
Figure 4. Extensive form of the Entry Game of Section IV.
see that no player has anything to gain by changing only their
own strategy, therefore in a fully autonomous environment the
cyclists will yield and the AVs will go, thus validating the
effectiveness of the changes.
IV. PEDESTRIAN VERSUS VEHICLE USING ENTRY GAME
A different approach is discussed in the following model:
instead of focusing on the generic environment, in this section
the attention is moved to the specific interaction between a
pedestrian on a sidewalk, who have to decide whether to cross
the road by jaywalking or not, and an upcoming vehicle.
The main differences from the previous model are:
• the absence of zebra crossing and the unknown types,
• actions are sequential,
• payoffs are not axiomatically given, but computed as
functions of environmental variables,
• the game itself does not consider at the same time an
AV and a human-driver. The comparison is made after-
wards between the simulation results acquired from two
instances of the same game with different parameters.
To look from a different standpoint, we consider an Entry
Game, where the first move is made by the pedestrian, who de-
cides whether to cross the road or to stay out on the sidewalk,
and after that, the car decides between keep going or brake.
A possible payoff to consider is time, because a pedestrian
approaching a crossing will consider, in first approximation,
the estimated car arrival time to decide whether to cross or
not. Fig. 4 shows the extensive form of the game.
In the proposed model, the pedestrian spends a constant
time to cross the road, computed using the parameters in-
dicated in [20], for what concerns the preferred speed-walk
of 1.4 m/s, and in [21], for what regards the worst case
lane width of 3.75 m in many countries including Italy. The
crossing time for the pedestrian is ta ≈ 2.67 s. Moreover,
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
Condition ta < tc tc < ta < t′c ta > t′c
NE CK CB O
Table II
NE SHIFT BASED ON ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES. CK=CROSS/KEEP,
CB=CROSS/BRAKE, O=OUT.
the time taken by an AV in order to reach the trajectories-
intersection point is
t′c =
√
v2 + 2ad− v
a
in case of deceleration
tc =
d
v
otherwise
where a is the acceleration, d is the distance between vehicle
and pedestrian, and v is the car speed at distance d.
The payoff for the pedestrian, in case of crossing, is
calculated as the difference between the time taken by the
car to reach him (t′c or tc according to the cases) and his
crossing time. It will be negative in case of collision and
will increase as much as the pedestrian’s perception of safety.
On the other side, if the pedestrian decides to stay out gets
a gain equal to the difference between his crossing time and
the car approaching time (braking case, t′c). This interval turns
negative in case t′c is big enough to allow him crossing.
The payoff for the car, in case of a static pedestrian, is
set a priori equal to 0, according to the absence of actions
carried out by the vehicle. In the crossing scenario, instead,
tc − ta acts as a pivot: if it is greater than 0 the car has
no incentive to brake because it reaches later the intersection
point, otherwise if it is lower than 0 the vehicle has to brake,
even if it is not sure to stop in time (this computation is
demanded to the pedestrian before making a decision). As a
sequential game, it can be solved via backward induction (i.e.
proceeding from the bottom of the tree and choosing what to
do in any situation); in this way, the equilibrium discovered is
not only a NE but also a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE),
in fact with these payoffs settings the strategies chosen by the
players always lead to a NE in each subgame. Since backward
induction focuses only on pure strategies, the equilibrium is
not influenced by the difference among them but only by their
ordinality. Solving the game bring to three cases, that become
NE according to the variables d and v, as shown in Table II.
For the simulation, it is assumed that the AV, in case of
braking, will start at constant deceleration a = −2.5 m/s2
from the initial distance generated as a uniform random
variable d ∼ U(10, 50) m; the speed value, instead, is
assumed to be Gaussian distributed around at 30 km/h, i.e.,
v ∼ G(30, 10) km/h. The number of iterations has been set
to 1000000 and the aim is to show the distribution of the NE
over the three different cases.
As a second experiment, the same interaction seen before
but in case of a human driver is analyzed. In this situation, the
braking action has to be revised due to the driver reaction time,
the worst case analysis is considered setting it to tr = 1.5 s
[22] (accounting for both the processing time of the brain and
the car dynamics but many other conditions may influence
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Figure 5. Histogram of occurrences for comparison between human-driven
vehicle and autonomous vehicle.
the result, depending on the physical model), thus the total
approaching time for the car in case of deceleration becomes:
t′′c =
√
v2 + 2a(d− dr)− v
a
+ tr where dr = v · tr
Another modification needed in order to adapt the model to
human behavior is the larger average speed, as human drivers
tend not to always respect the road limits. The random variable
representing speed is modified to v ∼ G(50, 10) km/h and the
same simulation is performed.
The results, summarized in Fig. 5, show a decreasing
number of the overall Cross situations in case of human driver,
while in case of AV there is an increasing number of such
situations. In the case of AVs, the pedestrian will be not only
safer but will tend to cross more frequently due to general
lower speed of AVs and faster reaction time of machine-type
drivers with respect to human-drivers. Moreover, since the
AVs tend to slow down in presence of pedestrians, there is a
higher number of situations of Cross-Keep.
However, the pedestrian may not properly know whether
the human driver is alert or not and may consider a mean
reaction time of about one second; in this setting if the driver
is absent-minded may not be able to stop in time and the eval-
uation of the pedestrian may be wrong. This situation can be
modeled considering an exponential reaction plus movement
time starting from 0.8 s: t′r ∼ 0.8 + Exp(0.2) s. With these
considerations, about 3% of the times the pedestrian implicitly
assumes a lower reaction time than the actual one and 0.036%
of the times it ends in a road accident.
Notice however, as already stated, that this paper proposes
some game theoretical models which can be useful for further
analysis; all the values need to be set and supported by
real data acquisitions but the baseline framework is truly
reliable and reusable although very lightweight as regards the
computational demand.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, some applications of game theoretical tech-
niques have been proposed and discussed. The literature
already reports that game theory is a useful application, and
key tools are supplied to deal with strategic interactions,
highlighting causal relationships among the road users. Nev-
ertheless, models are often simplistic, since making the model
too complex leads to a loss of physical meaning where the
right strategy to consider is unclear.
We applied a mixture of game theoretic techniques with
some realistic and sensible assumptions to reach the following
conclusions. The increasing number of AVs will reduce the
number of collisions but also it will imply a new approach to
road safety for pedestrians, arising the requirement of new
regulations; moreover, communication systems among the
AVs will be needed in order to optimize their traffic behavior.
Finally, game theoretic analysis also has the advantage of
allowing for distributed lightweight implementation inside the
vehicles.
Our future interests regard a possible development of the
scenarios presented in order to exploit also statistical tools,
which can bring into our framework the real data that can
validate the fairness and the calibration of the models.
As a follow-up study, for example, we intend to improve the
accuracy of the model, by the means of deep investigation
on the statistical road-user behaviors to set the payoffs more
faithfully, as well as to perform adaptation on real-world
data whenever they are available. Additionally, the simplistic
assumption that the AVs always yield will be relaxed under
specific conditions.
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